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Human-made GHGs work against us when they trap too much sunlight and 
block outward radiation. Scientists worry that the accumulation of these gases 
in the atmosphere has changed and will continue to change the climate. 
Potential climate risks include more severe weather patterns; hobbled 
ecosystems, with less biodiversity; changes in patterns of drought and flood, 
with less potable water; inundation of coastal areas from rising sea levels; and 
a greater spread of infectious diseases such as malaria, yellow fever, and 
cholera. On the plus side, climate change might benefit agriculture and 
forestry in certain locations by increasing productivity as a result of longer 
growing seasons and increased fertilization. Although climate change is not 
the same as day-to-day or even year-to-year fluctuations in the weather, the 
nature of these fluctuations could be altered by climate change. 
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1. Potential Physical and Socioeconomic Consequences 
The risk of climate change depends on the physical and socioeconomic 
implications of a changing climate. Climate change might have several effects: 
• Reduced productivity of natural resources that humans use or extract from the 
natural environment (for example, lower agricultural yields, smaller timber harvests, 
and scarcer water resources). 
• Damage to human-built environments (for example, coastal flooding from 
rising sea levels, incursion of salt water into drinking water systems, and damages 
from increased storms and floods). 
• Risks to life and limb (for example, more deaths from heat waves, storms, and 
contaminated water, and increased incidence of tropical diseases). 
• Damage to less managed resources such as the natural conditions conducive to 
different landscapes, wilderness areas, natural habitats for scarce species, and 
biodiversity. 
Sustainable development is addressing to the holistic development through the 
concepts linked with the eco-bio-economy, innovation and quality [Gurgu & Savu 
2015]. All of these damages are posited to result from changes in long-term GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere. Very rapid rates of climate change could 
exacerbate the damage. The adverse effects of climate change most likely will take 
decades or longer to materialize, however. Moreover, the odds that these events will 
come to pass are uncertain and not well understood. Numerical estimates of physical 
impacts are few, and confidence intervals are even harder to come by. The rise in sea 
level as a result of polar ice melting, for instance, is perhaps the best understood, and 
the current predicted range of change is still broad.  
Unknown physical risks are compounded by uncertain socioeconomic 
consequences. Cost estimates of potential impacts on market goods and services 
such as agricultural outputs can be made with some confidence, at least in 
developed countries. But cost estimates for nonmarket goods such as human and 
ecosystem health give rise to serious debate. 
In constructing a viable and effective risk-reducing climate policy, policymakers 
must address hazy estimates of the risks, the benefits from taking action, and the 
potential for adaptation against the uncertain but also consequential cost of 
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reducing GHGs. Costs of mitigation matter, as do costs of climate change itself. 
One must consider the consequences of committing resources to reducing climate 
change risks that could otherwise be used to meet other human interests, just as one 
must weigh the consequences of different climatic changes. 
Global change can exert severe impacts on the ecology of aquatic and wetland 
ecosystems, on the filter and transport functions of soils and on water quality. 
Assessments of these changes require a better understanding of the consequences of 
major hydrological changes, to identify and quantify the key bio-geochemical 
processes and to predict the consequences of global change at different scales. The 
integrated management of soil-water systems requires a detailed understanding of the 
properties, and the functional role of soils and the behaviour and fate of pollutants, in 
order to allow the development of risk-based management approaches.  Research 
will focus on the impacts of global change on the ecology of surface water bodies, on 
how to improve floodplain functioning and management, and on water-soil system 
functioning and management. 
 
2. The Importance of Evaluating Climate Change Risks 
Although uncertain, climate change risks are real and need to be better 
understood so as to avoid unwanted consequences. Many observers characterize 
responding to the risks of climate change as taking out insurance; nations try to 
reduce the odds of adverse events occurring through mitigation, and to reduce the 
severity of negative consequences by increasing the capacity for adaptation once 
climate change occurs. The insurance analogy underscores both the uncertainty that 
permeates how society and policymakers evaluate the issue and the need to respond 
to the risks in a timely way. 
Responding effectively to climate change risks requires society to consider the 
potential costs and benefits of various actions as well as inaction. By costs we 
mean the opportunity costs of GHG mitigation or adaptation – what society must 
forgo to pursue climate policy. Benefits are the gains from reducing climate change 
risks by lowering emissions or by enhancing the capacity for adaptation. An 
assessment of benefits and costs gives policymakers information they need to make 
educated decisions in setting the stringency of a mitigation policy (for example, 
how much GHG abatement to undertake, and when do it) and deciding how much 
adaptation infrastructure to create. 
It is important to consider the costs and the benefits of climate change policies 
because all resources – human, physical, and natural – are scarce. Policymakers 
 Issue 2/2019 
 128 
must consider the benefits not obtained when resources are devoted to reducing 
climate change risks, just as they must consider the climate change risks incurred 
or avoided from different kinds and degrees of policy response. Marginal benefits 
and costs reveal the gain from an incremental investment of time, talent, and other 
resources into mitigating climate risks, and the other opportunities forgone by 
using these resources for climate change risk mitigation. It is not a question of 
whether to address climate change but how much to address it. 
Critics object to a benefit-cost approach to climate change policy assessment on 
several grounds. Their arguments include the following: 
 The damages due to climate change, and thus the benefits of climate policies 
to mitigate these damages, are uncertain and thus inherently difficult to quantify 
given the current state of knowledge. Climate change also could cause large-scale, 
irreversible effects that are hard to address in a simple benefit-cost framework. 
Therefore, the estimated benefits of action are biased downward. 
 Climate mitigation costs are uncertain and could escalate rapidly from too-
aggressive emission control policies. Proponents of this view are indicating a 
concern about the risk of underestimating mitigation costs. 
 Climate change involves substantial equity issues – both among current 
societies and between current and future generations – that are questions of morality, 
not economic efficiency. Policymakers should be concerned with more than benefit-
cost analysis in judging the merits of climate policies. 
As these arguments indicate, some critics worry that economic benefit–cost 
analysis gives short shrift to the need for climate protection, whereas others are 
concerned that the results of the analysis will call for unwarranted expensive 
mitigation. Despite of rising prices for natural resources during the past 30 years, 
there is increase in the global consumption of natural resources [Begum & Egemen, 
2016]. 
Supporters of the conventional approach to discounting on grounds of economic 
efficiency argue just as vehemently that any evaluation of costs and benefits over 
time that understates the opportunity cost of forgone investment is a bad bargain for 
future generations because it distorts the distribution of investment resources over 
time. These supporters of standard discounting also argue that future generations are 
likely in any event to be better off than the present generation is, casting doubt on the 
basic premise of the critics’ concerns (Schelling, 1995). 
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Analyzing the benefits and costs of climate change mitigation requires 
understanding biophysical and economic systems as well as the interactions between 
them. Integrated assessment (IA) modelling combines the key elements of biophysical 
and economic systems into one integrated system (Figure 1). IA models strip down 
the laws of nature and human behaviour to their essentials to depict how more GHGs 
in the atmosphere raises temperature and how temperature increase induces 
economic losses. The models also contain enough detail about the drivers of energy 
use and interactions between energy and economy that one can determine the 




Fig. 1. Climate Change and Its Interaction (Darmstadter & Toman, 1993) 
 
Researchers use IA models to simulate a path of carbon reductions over time 
that would maximize the present value of avoided damages (that is, the benefits of 
a particular climate policy) less mitigation costs. As noted above, considerable 
controversy surrounds this procedure.  
A striking finding of many IA models is the apparent desirability of imposing 
only limited GHG controls over the next 20 or 30 years. According to the estimates 
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in most IA models, the costs of sharply reducing GHG concentrations today are too 
high relative to the modest benefits the reductions are projected to bring. 
Irreversibility of GHG emissions is yet another factor influencing the benefits of 
GHG abatement. Because GHG emissions persist in the atmosphere for decades, 
even centuries, the resulting long-term damages strengthen the rationale for early and 
aggressive GHG control. Moreover, given that some damage costs from adjusting to 
a changed climate depend on the rate of climate change, immediate action also might 
be valuable. To date, however, the importance of this factor has not been 
conclusively demonstrated; the gradual abatement policies implied by the IA models 
do not seem likely to increase the speed of further climate change that much. 
 
3. Uncertainty in the Social Cost of Carbon 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is the estimate of the cost of climate change 
damages. The net effects of impacts on economies and societies of long term trends 
in climate conditions, including extreme events, related to anthropogenic emission 
of greenhouse gases. Such estimates have been compiled in order to aid 
consideration of greenhouse gas emission policies and to prioritise adaptation 
strategies according to their potential effectiveness. Social science [Reto & Joeri, 
2015] needs to point out where ethical and moral choices are required, and what a 
desirable world for future generations might look like. In our view, the greatest 
challenges to overcome may well be of a societal and political rather than technical 
and financial nature. 
The term, social cost of carbon (SCC), generally refers to the marginal cost of 
climate change impacts. The SCC is usually estimated as the net present value of 
the impact over the next 100 years (or longer) of one additional ton of carbon 
emitted to the atmosphere today. This should not be confused with the total impact 
of climate change or the average impact (the total divided by the total emissions of 
carbon). The SCC is expressed as the economic value (in US$, € or GB£) per ton 
of carbon (tC). In this assessment, the baseline is the year 2000 for the emissions as 
well as for the net present value. In some literature, but not in this report, marginal 
damages are related to 1 ton of carbon dioxide. Vulnerability to a given climate 
change is a function of population growth, economic growth, and technological 
progress [David & Richard, 2011]. 
This review of uncertainty in estimates of the social cost of carbon is 
summarised in key  messages: 
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Understanding of the social cost of carbon: 
 Our understanding of future climatic risks, spanning trends and surprises in 
the climate system, exposure to impacts, and adaptive capacity, is improving, but 
knowledge of the costs of climate change impacts is still poor. 
 The lack of adequate sectoral studies and understanding of local to regional 
interactions precludes establishing a central estimate of the social cost of carbon 
with any confidence. 
 The balance of benefits and damages in the social cost of carbon shifts 
markedly over time, with net damages increasing in later time periods. Estimates of 
the SCC are particularly sensitive to the choice of discount rates and the temporal 
profile of net damages. 
 Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change impacts are dynamic 
processes responding to climatic signals, multiple stresses, and interactions among 
actors. Large scale impacts, such as migration, can be triggered by relatively 
modest climate changes in vulnerable regions. 
 
Uncertainty and risk: 
 Climate uncertainties and the climate sensitivity are key factors in larger 
estimates of the social cost of carbon. 
 Uncertainties in coverage, sectoral assessments and regional processes are 
likely to be significant, but are difficult to judge without further model 
development and inter-model comparison. 
 Decision variables such as the discount rate equity weighting also are 
extremely important. 
 
The range of estimates of the social cost of carbon: 
 Estimates of the social cost of carbon reflected uncertainties in climate and 
impacts, coverage of sectors and extremes, and choices of decision variables. 
 An upper benchmark of the SCC for global policy contexts is more difficult 
to deduce from the present state-of-the-art, but the risk of higher values for the 
social cost of carbon is significant. 
Significant improvement in estimates of the SCC will require well validated 
assessments at the regional scale of the dynamic processes of vulnerability and 
adaptation. Partnerships among researchers and stakeholders in developing 
countries are essential. 
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The arrows on the three axes imply increasing uncertainty, although not 




Fig. 2. Schematic Mapping of Multiple Lines of Evidence  
in Understanding Uncertainty in the Social Cost of Carbon 
 
Framing of estimates of the SCC is organised as a matrix of confidence in 
projections of future climate change and understanding of economic valuation 
(Figure 3). The climate axis ranges from projections of global and regional 
temperature, to bounded scenarios of changes in precipitation and risk of storms, to 
systemic, large scale changes such as collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, shift 
in ocean circulations, or reversal of the biosphere carbon sink. 
The corresponding economic axis begins with market sectors, with uncertainty 
expanding to the valuation of non-market sectors such as coral reefs, and socially 
contingent feedbacks, such as conflict over water, that exacerbate sectoral impacts 
or present non-marginal impacts at the local to regional level. Note that socially 
contingent effects are a class of non-market impacts, where B might be considered 
micro-economic effects and C includes macro-economic effects. 
 




Fig. 3. A Risk Assessment Framework 
 
The gradient across the matrix, from top-left to bottom-right suggests an 
increase in uncertainty. The larger scale climate changes are still speculative and 
often described as surprises outside the realm of current global model predictions. 
The relative lack of studies of non-market and socially contingent effects increases 
uncertainty in estimates of the SCC. 
The gradient also reflects different timings of impacts. Systemic changes in the 
global climate are posited on a century time scale (e.g., collapse of the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet); collapse of regional societies and economies is not forecast in 
the next few decades (if at all). Some of the largest uncertainties, such as release of 
methane hydrates, are events that are not fixed to a particular time frame. 
At present, the most commonly held assertion is that the net non-market and 
socially contingent costs will be adverse (rather than benefits). However, there is 
insufficient evidence to suggest that the gradient from upper-left to lower-right is 
necessarily a substantial increase in the total social cost of carbon. 
The typical situations with each cell may help to illustrate both the range of 
issues inherent in estimating the SCC as well as the role of the risk matrix. 
For the column of impacts related to markets (A): 
• A1: Global and regional temperatures are projected to increase with relatively 
high confidence. To the extent that warmer conditions would expand the area 
suitable for agriculture, leading to climate impacts (in this case benefits) that are 
readily valued through market exchanges (such as the price of major commodities, 
value of agricultural land, net profit to producers or net benefit to consumers). Sea 
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level rise is the other major climatic element with high confidence, leading to 
impacts on coastal communities, loss of dry land and wetland, forced migration, 
and the costs of coastal protection. 
• A2: Most climate elements are uncertain at the regional level, but current 
climate models project changes within a reasonable range. Such bounded risks 
include increases or decreases in precipitation, intensity and tracks of storms, and the 
frequency and magnitude of other climatic extreme events (e.g., floods, droughts, 
lightning). The market impacts, for example of drought on agriculture, can be 
estimated in principle although it is difficult to differentiate between the effect of 
climate change and other stresses and responses that shape economic outcomes. 
Current scenarios of climate change may underestimate drought risks, leading to a 
possible bias toward short-term benefits of climate change for agriculture. 
A3: System change and surprises are plausible climate outcomes that are not 
readily evaluated in a probabilistic framework, such as a weakening of the 
thermohaline circulation, changes to the phases of the major ocean-atmosphere 
modes (such as ENSO), the more extreme scenarios of collapse of the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet, large releases of methane hydrates or reversals of the terrestrial 
carbon uptake. While the market effects can be described, the impacts over large 
areas and time scales are not linear and therefore difficult to value in a micro-
economic framework. For example, what would be the (net) value of displacement 
of all of the major world coastal cities due to a 3-5m sea level rise? 
Effects on non-market sectors (B) are more difficult to value in that there are 
little empirical data on how people in different countries and economic classes 
value amenities, species, landscapes and other qualities of livelihoods. Contingent 
valuation based on willingness to pay or willingness to accept principles give some 
guidance, but such values are often contentious and may not scale up from local 
issues to the widespread effects of climate change. Examples of the sectors and 
issues in this column are: 
• B1: Warmer temperatures and higher humidity, both projected to increase with 
some confidence, will alter the amenity value of climates. In northern Europe, for 
instance, longer and warmer summers will encourage more people to enjoy the 
outdoors and visit local tourist destinations. On the other hand, a greater incidence 
of heat waves in southern Europe may be problematic and losses in boreal and 
mountain ecosystems and winter tourism are likely.  
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• B2: The bounded risks of changes in major cyclones, for instance, would 
affect coastal ecosystems and agricultural land subject to increasing frequency and 
severity of coastal flooding and salt water inundation. The value of species lost in 
local environments is difficult to estimate. 
• B3: Catastrophic effects that lead to global losses of species are even more 
difficult to value, not least because the impacts of climate change on global 
ecosystems and species biodiversity is not well understood. 
The socially contingent column (C) captures the secondary effects and multiple 
stresses of climate change across a range of sectors. For instance, it is possible that 
reasonably small changes in climate change could lead to significant impacts through 
multipliers (such as the effect of water shortages on agriculture), high vulnerabilities 
(such as migration triggered by increased cyclone frequencies) and behavioural 
responses to the risk (such as disinvestment from commercial agriculture in some 
regions). Such socially contingent effects are a sub-set of nonmarket impacts. The 
mechanisms of such responses may not be readily captured in either microeconomic 
valuations or macro-economic models. The range of potential values is likely to be 
influenced by the decision framework, for instance whether potential liability for 
regional damages is a motivation for a precautionary approach. Examples include: 
• C1: Projected changes in mean temperatures and sea level rise, at least over the 
next few decades, are unlikely, on their own, to trigger significant socially contingent 
effects. The exception may be snow melt and glacial lake outburst floods, significant 
in some regions. 
• C2: Changes in water cycles, along with drought and flood risks, are potential 
drivers of regional migration, loss of an agricultural economy and crises for mega 
cities without reliable water supplies. The extent of the world where such effects 
are most likely has not been rigorously evaluated, but the Sahel and coastal deltas 
such as Bangladesh are frequently mentioned. Regions of existing and exacerbated 
water scarcity could be subject to conflict. 
• C3: The displacement of entire cities due to extreme sea level rise is a good 
example of a socially contingent effect with high uncertainty, in both the risks of 
climate change and in the means to value such impacts. A case study of the 
potential impacts of an adaptation to a 5 meter sea level rise illustrates the issues. 
The risk matrix is a guide to understanding uncertainties in the social cost of 
carbon. The risk matrix does not show explicitly three additional factors affecting 
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uncertainty. Two are mentioned above: (i) the role of decision frameworks and 
choice and (ii) the time profile of climate change and its impacts. 
The third factor (iii) concerns the method for aggregating estimates of the SCC in 
each cell to an overall value. It is not immediately apparent that decision makers 
would simply add up net values for each cell in the matrix. They may wish to 
account for those who suffer losses differently from those who gain. Such a concern 
might arise from awareness of political responsibilities, assessment of the risk of 
disruption associated with losses, or recognition of the non-substitutability of some 
environmental systems and cultural inheritance. Or, they may chose to weight some 
values differently than others. For instance market values might not be equity 
weighted while a high equity weight might be applied to the socially contingent 
values. 
The risk matrix is a frame of reference, but does not imply specific values for the 
SCC for the less certain impacts and valuations (that is, for row 3 and columns B and 
C). Further studies and estimates of all of the cells are required to judge the extent to 
which sampling across all of the cells is required to produce a robust estimate of the 
SCC. However, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests 
that the larger impacts will become more likely as global temperatures rise 
particularly beyond the middle range of 2-3 °C (IPCC). The cascade of impacts 
across sectors and regions becomes an increasing concern if global warming exceeds 
5 °C or so. However, this conclusion is in the nature of expert judgement, since there 
are few detailed studies presently available in the literature. 
Integration of estimates of the SCC into stakeholder decision frameworks offers 
opportunities to interpret the boundaries of the SCC according to the values of 
different stakeholders and decision contexts. However, further research on the 
utility of approaches is required. The methodological implications of a hierarchy of 
estimates, corresponding to the scale of decision making, and similarly the use of 
multiple indicators of concern, should be identified at an early stage. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
The rapid rise in greenhouse gas emissions has led to increasing concerns about 
climate change and its environmental, health and economic consequences across the 
world. Consequently, international efforts have gained momentum to develop policy 
frameworks that will control or reduce greenhouse gas emissions over a certain 
period of time. These policy efforts have been informed by extensive research that 
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assesses the engineering methods and technologies to reduce greenhouse gas 
mitigation and determines the economic feasibility of the proposed methods. In 
recent years, this research has focused on investigating the costs of mitigation to 
achieve stabilisation targets in the presence of induced technological change, that is, 
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